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Invisibility is often thought to occur because of the low-level limitations of the visual
system. For example, it is often assumed that backward masking renders a target
invisible because the visual system is simply too slow to resolve the target and the mask
separately. Here, we propose an alternative explanation in which invisibility is a goal rather
than a limitation and occurs naturally when making sense out of the plethora of incoming
information. For example, we present evidence that (in)visibility of an element can strongly
depend on how it groups with other elements. Changing grouping changes visibility. In
addition, we will show that features often just appear to be invisible but are in fact visible
in a way the experimenter is not aware of.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is often assumed that invisibility reflects fundamental limita-
tions of the human visual system and, vice versa, any stimulus
that is above these limitations becomes automatically visible. For
example, objects that are too small with respect to the spatial
resolution of the visual system are invisible but can be clearly
perceived after magnification by a microscope. However, there
are interesting cases where a stimulus is visible when presented
alone but becomes invisible when it is presented with other stim-
uli. Here, the stimulus itself is clearly above the basic resolution
limits of the visual system. There are two cases. The first case is
based on rather low-level “irreversible” automatic mechanisms.
For example, a clearly visible but faint line becomes invisible in
the neighborhood of a high luminance patch because of gain con-
trol. Similarly, the stars are invisible during the day because the
bright sunlight drives the rod system into saturation. In these
cases, invisibility occurs because of adjusting the dynamic range
of the visual system to that of the environment. However, we claim
that there are many situations, frequently used in consciousness
research and many other fields, where invisibility is not caused
by such low-level– and irreversible– factors, in the sense that
“flexible” changes in context can lead to drastic changes in visi-
bility. Here, we show evidence for this second type of invisibility
by the example of visual masking but argue that similar pro-
cesses of Gestalt formation play a central role for (in)visibility in
general.
In masked priming studies, a target is followed by a mask
(Klotz and Neumann, 1999; Schmidt, 2002; Vorberg et al., 2003).
In a first condition, observers are asked to discriminate the fea-
tures of the target (direct measure). If parameters of the target
and mask are well chosen, performance on the target is at or close
to chance level, i.e., its features are unconscious and invisible. Still,
the features of the target can prime response times when observers
discriminate, in a second condition, features of the mask (indirect
measure). We like to mention that in most of these studies only
the features of the target are unconscious, and not the target itself.
The priming effects are often explained by pre-activation of the
motor system (e.g., Klotz and Neumann, 1999; Schmidt, 2002;
Vorberg et al., 2003). In a fast, unconscious processing sweep,
the target pre-activates the motor cortex, which leads to speeded
or slowed processing when the task is on the mask. Support for
this motor pre-activation comes frommany behavioral (Schmidt,
2002) and ERP studies (e.g., Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2000).
However, why are the target features invisible at all? Invisibility
is usually thought to occur because of the limitations of the visual
system. For example in integration masking, it is assumed that
target and mask integrate into one conglomerate because the
visual system cannot separate the two stimuli due to its limited
temporal resolution. Integration may well occur as early as on
the retinal level and can be seen as a superposition of the tar-
get and mask, similar to when two slides are projected together
(e.g., Di Lollo, 1980; Kahneman, 1968; Scheerer, 1973). Hence,
invisibility occurs because the system is at its temporal limits.
Other mechanisms rely on different types of masking and other
types of low level mechanisms such as in metacontast masking
(see Discussion).
Here, we show evidence that invisibility is often not the out-
come of limitations of the visual system. Instead, we argue that
invisibility is due to purposeful interpretation, i.e., a goal rather
than a limitation. Visibility and invisibility depend on how ele-
ments group and occur naturally and necessarily because of the
ill-posed problems of vision.
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2. REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
2.1. EXCELLENT TEMPORAL PRECISION
Consider the situation in Figure 1A. A right offset vernier is fol-
lowed immediately by a left offset vernier or vice versa. An almost
aligned vernier is perceived, a phenomenon called feature fusion
(Efron, 1967; Herzog et al., 2003). Participants cannot perceive
the individual verniers1. This outcome is classically explained by
integration masking where the two verniers are invisible because
of a lack of temporal resolution (Scheerer, 1973; Turvey, 1973).
The human brain is simply not able to render the two elements
visible individually.
1Note that if the offsets of the verniers are large, one can see four line segments
instead of two, while for intermediate offsets, motion is perceived, see Figure
1 in Scharnowski et al. (2007b). Here the vernier offsets are kept small enough
so as to have fusion of the two verniers.
However, this is not the case. When we presented an array
of 25 verniers in the second frame, the first vernier became vis-
ible and discrimination of its offset was only slightly deteriorated
compared to when presented alone (Figures 1B,C; Hermens et al.,
2009). Hence, even though the two central verniers are identical
to the feature fusion condition, the human brain can now easily
resolve the two verniers and their offsets. We propose that the 25
verniers are grouped as one array of elements independently of
the first vernier, which is thus rendered visible as an element in
its own right (Herzog and Koch, 2001; Herzog and Fahle, 2002;
Ghose et al., 2013). In line with this proposition, the offset direc-
tion of the 25 verniers has almost no influence, i.e., performance
is roughly the same when the 25 verniers are offset in the oppo-
site direction than the first vernier or not offset at all (Hermens
et al., 2009). Spatial grouping of the vernier array prevents the
temporal integration of the first and second vernier, even though
FIGURE 1 | (A) Feature fusion. A right or left vernier (V) is followed by a
second vernier with an opposite offset direction (anti-vernier, AV). Only one
vernier with an almost aligned offset is perceived. Observers cannot tell
whether the first or second vernier is offset to the right. Hence, the verniers
themselves are unconscious (direct measure of awareness). (B) When the
second vernier is flanked by 12 copies of itself on each side, temporal feature
fusion almost completes ceases. The first vernier becomes visible as an
element in its own right, appearing to be superimposed on the grating of 25
anti-verniers. (C) To give quantitative expression, we determined vernier
dominance. In each trial, we determined whether the response of the
observers matched the offset direction of the first vernier. Hence, a 100%
score means that observers pushed always the button according to the first
vernier. A 0% score means observers decided always according to the
second vernier, and for 50% both verniers contributed equally on average.
Performance is at ceiling for a single vernier (V). Adding the anti-vernier leads
to anti-vernier dominance (in accordance with the fact that in fusion, the latter
element dominates). When there are 2∗12 copies of the second vernier, the
first vernier becomes visible and performance is almost as good as for the
single vernier (V-25AV; only 2∗6 verniers are shown here). Locally, at the
center, the very same first and second vernier are presented as in the
previous conditions. Performance is roughly independent of whether or not
these verniers are offset or aligned indicating again that there is no temporal
fusion (V-AV24N). We argue that spatial integration trumps temporal fusion.
Visibility of the first vernier depends on grouping and not on low level
limitations. Data from Hermens et al. (2009). (D) Bloch’s law for 3-vernier
sequences. Doubling the luminance of the anti-vernier has the same effect as
doubling its duration (doubled luminances are indicated by bold font). Data
from Scharnowski et al. (2007a).
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both are presented at the same retinal location in both conditions.
This suggests that (in)visibility depends crucially on perceptual
grouping.
Next, we show that the integration of vernier offsets is
extremely precise, meaning that while participants cannot report
the individual verniers, information about their individual off-
sets, durations and luminance is still preserved. We presented
three verniers in immediate succession. The first and last vernier
had always the same offset direction (left or right), whereas the
second vernier was offset in the opposite direction. Presentation
time was 10ms for the first and last vernier, and varied for the
second vernier. When the second vernier’s duration was 5ms,
performance was strongly determined by the first (and third)
vernier (Figure 1D). When we doubled the luminance of the
second vernier, still presented for 5ms, it contributed more
strongly to performance (Figure 1D), meaning that although par-
ticipants could not tell how many verniers were presented and
of what luminance, the brain still incorporates this informa-
tion. Performance remained on this level when we increased
the duration to 10ms but reduced the luminance to normal.
Hence, increasing/decreasing the duration can be compensated by
decreasing/increasing the luminance. Feature fusion follows pre-
cisely Bloch’s law, which states that brightness is the product of
luminance times duration (Scharnowski et al., 2007a). Hence, we
have shown that even though the individual vernier offsets are
invisible, the human brain carefully analyzes and integrates them
into one offset, which in turn is consciously perceived. This means
that in feature fusion, the outputs of specific feature detectors
(vernier offsets) are combined into ameaningful percept, depend-
ing on perceptual grouping. This is very different from integra-
tion masking, in which integration results in a “pixel-by-pixel”
conglomerate of the target and the mask (on the retinal level),
similar to when two slides are projected together superimposed.
Here is another illustration of why feature fusion differs funda-
mentally from integration masking. In the case of feature fusion
with the two verniers (Figure 1C), performance is close to the
50% level with a slight dominance of the second vernier. This
result may be taken as chance level performance because of inte-
gration masking (the superposition of a first right and second left
vernier is the same as the other way around and, hence, observers
cannot discriminate the two situations). However, as we have
argued, the 50% level just shows that the two vernier offsets are
equally weighted in the integration. Performance quickly changes
from 50% when one of the verniers has a slightly higher lumi-
nance (or offset size). Similar results were found for complex
sequences of verniers (Hermens et al., 2010).
Feature fusion occurs also in other visual domains. For exam-
ple, when a red disk is followed by a green disk, only one yellow
disk is perceived (Efron, 1967, 1973). Also here, while the indi-
vidual elements (the disks) are not visible to the participants,
the features of the elements are still registered by the brain and
combined into one perceived object.
2.2. UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND LONG LASTING FEATURE INTEGRATION
Up to now, we have provided evidence that invisibility can be the
result of grouping rather than of low level limitations of the visual
system. Here, we show, first, that the vernier offsets are indeed
unconscious. Second, the unconscious offsets are represented in
the visual system for an extensive duration (of around 420ms)
even though the individual stimuli (vernier and anti-vernier) are
presented for a short time (30ms each).
We presented a vernier and the anti-vernier, as above.
Observers were told about the set-up and asked whether the first
or second vernier is offset to the right (Scharnowski et al., 2009).
Performance was at about 52%, i.e., almost at chance level. As an
aside note, we use two direct measures to test for unconsciousness
(“which vernier is offset to the right” and “what is the conscious,
fused vernier offset”) rather than a direct and an indirect one
(based on reaction times, as in priming studies, e.g., Schmidt,
2002; Vorberg et al., 2003).
Next, we show that the unconscious vernier offsets are not
only carefully analyzed and integrated but that this process lasts
for up to 420ms after stimulus onset. We presented the first and
second vernier for 30ms each. We adjusted the second vernier
offset such that dominance was at about 50% for each partici-
pant. Hence, both verniers contributed equally to feature fusion
(Figure 2). Next, we applied Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMS) at various stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) over the
occipital lobe. For SOAs up to 120ms, TMS led to dominance of
the second vernier. From 120 to 420ms, the first vernier domi-
nated. The most important conclusion from this finding is that
the two verniers cannot be fully integrated before 420ms for the
following reason. By design, both verniers contribute equally to
fusion in the basic no-TMS-condition. When the verniers were
integrated immediately, TMS could only modulate the combined
representation but not favor one vernier over the other. The trick
of the experiment is that the 50% dominance level (equal contri-
bution of both verniers to fusion) and chance level performance
are the same. In this sense, whatever the effect of TMS on the
integrated representation is, discrimination of its offset remains
at chance (similar to the outcome when observers would close
their eyes). Now by the converse argument, if performance is not
at 50%, TMS “favors” one vernier over the other and hence the
two cannot be fully integrated, i.e., there are separate representa-
tions for the two verniers for at least 420ms (Scharnowski et al.,
2009). As an implication, this experiment provides evidence that
conscious access to feature information in our paradigm can-
not emerge before 420ms, since the vernier offsets themselves are
unconsciousness as shown above.
We like to add that vernier fusion, as well as color and motion
fusion, can be manipulated also by light masks, instead of TMS
(Pilz et al., 2013).
2.3. FEATURE INTEGRATION ACROSS SPACE AND TIME
Up to now, we have shown that, first, whether an element is
rendered visible or invisible can crucially depend on percep-
tual grouping. In these instances, invisibility cannot be explained
by limited temporal resolution or other low-level mechanisms.
Second, we have provided evidence that features even of invisible
elements are carefully registered and, depending on grouping,
integrated with other elements. Third, we have shown that uncon-
scious feature integration can be a long lasting process. Using
TMS, we found that consciousness does not emerge before
420ms.
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FIGURE 2 | The influence of TMS on feature fusion. A sequence of a vernier
and an anti-vernier is followed by a TMS-pulse to the occipital cortex. The
offsets of the vernier and anti-vernier are adjusted so that for each participant,
vernier dominance is at 50%without TMS (dotted line). TMS applied at SOAs
20–120ms leads to dominance of the second vernier, TMS applied at SOAs
120–420ms leads to dominance of the first vernier. The long-lasting TMS effect
indicates that feature integration cannot be completed before 420ms. Figure
adapted from Scharnowski et al. (2009). The arrow indicates the TMS pulse.
The question arises, why is feature integration so long lasting?
Why is there is such a long period of unconsciousness? Here, we
will suggest that the brain needs to integrate information across
extended periods because we and the world are in permanent
motion. In addition, we will show that features of an invisible ele-
ment can be rendered visible at other elements. Hence, features of
elements can be transported across space.
We presented a left or right offset vernier as the first ele-
ment, followed by a sequence of aligned verniers (Figure 3).
Two expanding streams of lines are perceived originating from
the center of the screen (sequential metacontrast, Otto et al.,
2006). The first vernier is rendered unconscious. To show this,
we presented the sequence with and without the vernier in two
subsequent intervals. Observers indicated whether the vernier
was present or absent (direct measure). Performance was close
to chance level. Surprisingly, however, the vernier offset is vis-
ible at the flankers even though the flankers are aligned and
the vernier itself is invisible (feature inheritance; Herzog and
Koch, 2001; Sharikadze et al., 2005). In quantitative experi-
ments, observers could well discriminate whether the offset is
to the left or right (second direct measure; Figure 3). When
one or more of the flanking lines are offset themselves, the
target and flanker offsets integrate as in feature fusion with
two verniers presented one after the other at the same loca-
tion. When the offsets are in the same direction, performance
improves. When the offsets are in opposite direction, they can-
cel each other out. Sequential metacontrast therefore shows
that features are integrated across different retinotopic locations.
Integration is almost linear (Otto et al., 2006, 2008). We pro-
pose that the first vernier and all flankers are interpreted as being
part of a whole (the motion of one line) and, for this reason,
the individual elements are rendered invisible. Similar feature
inheritance like effects, called feature transposition or feature
attribution2, have been reported also in other paradigms (Werner,
1935; Stewart and Purcell, 1970; Wilson and Johnson, 1985;
2These terms emphasize different aspects of the phenomenon. Feature inher-
itance emphasizes the changes occurring to the mask, feature transposition
Hofer et al., 1989; Herzog and Koch, 2001; Parkes et al., 2001;
Enns, 2002; Nishida et al., 2005; Ög˘men et al., 2006; Otto et al.,
2006, 2008).
In the sequential metacontrast paradigm the target itself is
completely rendered unconscious (direct measure), i.e., observers
cannot even tell whether or not there is a vernier. In most other
masking paradigms this is not the case, as mentioned above. In
these paradigms, even though the target is subjectively invisible,
there are still somemotion and luminance cues allowing for target
detection. As in feature fusion, we have shown that the uncon-
scious vernier changes the perception of a second direct measure,
namely the inherited vernier offsets, visible at the flanks. Hence,
our paradigm shows unconscious processing that is independent
of pre-activations of themotor-cortex, as inmasked priming (e.g.,
Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2000). The invisible vernier target off-
set is even integrated with offsets of flanking elements, which
can be presented more than 400ms after target onset, which is
much longer than the reaction times in mask priming experi-
ments. We have recently shown that feature fusion even precedes
motor-priming (Grainger et al., 2013). As in the TMS experi-
ment above, the sequential metacontrast paradigm shows that
features of invisible elements can persist in the human brain for
substantially long times.
As in the case of vernier fusion at one retinotopic location,
non-retinotopic integration follows “flexible” grouping rules as
demonstrated in Figure 3B. As before, we propose that the human
brain first carefully analyzes complex motion trajectories and,
then, integrates features alongmotion streams. Changes in group-
ing lead to changes in integration.
Such a mechanism makes sense from an ecological perspec-
tive. At night, a car is running through a modestly illuminated
street. The luminance (color of car  light shining on car)
changes strongly from instance to instance because of the distance
between street lights, shadows, reflections, etc. In addition, each
emphasizes the transfer of the feature from the target to the mask, while fea-
ture attribution emphasizes the interpretive process where the target andmask
are linked to each other via motion grouping and thus share their features.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Feature integration also occurs when elements are presented
at different retinotopic locations. A central vernier, offset either to the left or
right, was flanked by aligned verniers after short ISIs leading to the percept
of an expanding motion stream. Even though the vernier is invisible by
metacontrast masking, its offset is perceived at the aligned verniers. To give
quantitative expression, we asked observers to attend to the left (or right)
motion stream and report the perceived offset. The task is natural to the
observers since the vernier offset is inherited to the flanking lines and thus
clearly visible. Adding an opposite offset (anti-offset) to one flanking line,
leads to integration as in feature fusion. Integration of vernier and flanker
offsets occurs only in the attended stream (blue arrows indicate the attended
stream). When the offset of the flanker is presented in the non-attended
stream, it is not integrated with the vernier offset (C). (B) Integration depends
on flexible grouping. We presented “bending streams” leading to similar
integration of the vernier offset when observers attend to either the right or
left stream because the vernier is inherited to both streams (A,B). In (C) we
added an anti-offset to the second flanker of the right stream, i.e., at the
same spatial location as the central vernier. The vernier and flanker offset
integrated. Next, we added single lines to the vernier, which changed the
spatio-temporal grouping and, accordingly, feature integration (D, E). If the
line is presented to the left of the vernier, the vernier is inherited to the left
stream only and hence its offset is integrated in the left stream. For this
reason, the vernier offset is not integrated in the right stream and thus the
flanker anti-offset dominates performance when observers attend to the right
stream (performance is below 50% because the flanker offset is always
offset in the opposite direction than the vernier). (E) When the single line in
the first frame is placed to the left of the central vernier, grouping and hence
performance changes. The vernier offset is now exclusively integrated in the
right stream and thus vernier and flanker offset cancel each other. Figures
adopted from Otto et al. (2006).
photoreceptor receives information only for a very short time.
Hence, averaging across the motion trajectory is a first step to
compute the “true” color of the car, independent of the illumina-
tion. In addition, the car may disappear when passing through a
shadow. During this period, averaging needs to stop and only con-
tinue when the car reappears. Similarly, we have shown that the
brain stores vernier offset information in a short term memory
when the verniers are occluded. After re-appearance the memory
re-opens and continues averaging vernier offsets (Scharnowski
et al., 2007b).
3. DISCUSSION
3.1. INVISIBILITY UNDER DIFFERENT MASKING TYPES
How a visible stimulus becomes invisible due to the presence
of another stimulus is the focus of visual masking research
(Bachmann, 1994; Breitmeyer and Ög˘men, 2006). Visual masking
is not a unitary phenomenon and several different types of mask-
ing have been identified. First, one can classify masking into two
broad types, masking by light andmasking by pattern (Breitmeyer
and Ög˘men, 2006). In masking by light, the mask consists of a
uniform light field. The loss of target visibility in this masking
type can be explained by the aforementioned low-level irre-
versible factors related to dynamic range adjustments. Masking by
pattern can be divided into two broad types, pattern masking by
noise and pattern masking by structure (Breitmeyer and Ög˘men,
2006). In pattern masking by noise, the mask is a noise pattern,
such as an array of randomly placed dots, which do not bear struc-
tural similarity to the target. Here, with appropriate timing, the
target and mask integrate into one conglomerate thereby ham-
pering the visibility of the target (Breitmeyer and Ög˘men, 2006).
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However, we claim that a different process takes place when both
the target and mask have structure and the visual system forms
Gestalts both in space and time (Ternus, 1938). We suggest that
this process is flexible in that it can lead to integration or segre-
gation in time depending on the context. Thus, invisibility arising
from temporal integration is not a limitation of visual system due
to its slow dynamics, but rather a purposeful computation as part
of selecting the best Gestalt across space and time.
More recently, it has been proposed that four-dot mask-
ing, also known as object substitution masking or common
onset masking, is a fundamentally different type of mask-
ing (Enns and Di Lollo, 1997, 2000; Di Lollo et al., 2000).
Even though there is a debate whether this is a truly differ-
ent type of masking (Breitmeyer and Ög˘men, 2000; Di Lollo
et al., 2002; Francis and Hermens, 2002; Breitmeyer and Ög˘men,
2006) it is important to highlight some similarities and dif-
ferences between two models that are based on this paradigm
and our approach. These accounts, known as object substitu-
tion or updating masking, are based on object-level represen-
tations (Enns and Di Lollo, 1997, 2000; Di Lollo et al., 2000;
Lleras and Moore, 2003; Moore and Lleras, 2005; Pilling and
Gellatly, 2010). They propose that the invisibility of a target
results from the substitution or updating of the target represen-
tation by the mask representation during the iterative activities
set up in cortical reentrant (feedback) loops. Under the four-
dot or common onset masking conditions, the features of the
invisible target are incorporated into the mask. Thus, accord-
ing to these theories, feature attribution is clearly linked to the
process of masking by the common process of object substitu-
tion, which occurs during reentrant object updating3 . Hence,
these approaches predict a strong correlation between feature
attribution and masking. On the other hand, in our approach
we predict a dissociation between visual masking and feature
attribution (Ög˘men, 2007; Ög˘men and Herzog, 2010; Ög˘men
et al., 2006; Otto et al., 2006; Noory et al., under review). We
tested these contrasting predictions in a study where we deter-
mined the correlations between feature attribution, masking,
and motion (Breitmeyer et al., 2008). We found that feature
attribution correlated strongly with motion, but not with back-
ward masking (Breitmeyer et al., 2008). Thus, these results argue
against object substitution or updating models and support a
model wherein feature attribution and masking serve comple-
mentary but distinct roles (Ög˘men, 2007; Ög˘men and Herzog,
2010).
3.2. THE MANY MECHANISMS OF INVISIBILITY
Invisibility, as a goal and interpretation, is ubiquitous, occurs on
many levels wherever the human brain needs to solve the ill-posed
problems of vision (see below). For example, the hexagon on the
3It is important to note that under four dot masking paradigm, no mask-
ing occurs when attention is not divided and directed to the target. From
this point of view, object substitution is not applicable to the results shown
here because in the presently discussed work the target location is predictable
and receives full attentional resources. The object updating account may
be applicable depending on specific mechanisms of object updating, which,
unfortunately, remain unspecified.
left of Figure 4A is clearly visible. The shape in the middle con-
tains this hexagon as well, but due to the grouping of the oblique
lines into a global but simpler pattern, the hexagon becomes
invisible. Highlighting the hexagon by a color difference leads
to another perceptual organization where the hexagon becomes
visible again. Other well known examples are binocular rivalry
and ambiguous figures (Figure 4). There are many other “flexi-
ble” mechanisms that can render a target invisible. For example
in change blindness, a target, even though presented for extended
amounts of time, is invisible because of a lack of attention (for
reviews, see Simons and Rensink, 2005; Simons and Levin, 1997).
Moreover, it has been shown that visibility of the target in mask-
ing is influenced by the task. In particular, differences are found
when participants are asked to report the luminance of the target,
compared to when they are asked to respond as quickly as possi-
ble to the location of the target (Fehrer and Raab, 1962; Schiller
and Smith, 1966; Ög˘men et al., 2003). Hence, visibility of the
brightness of a stimulus may be impaired in different ways than
the visibility of the spatial position of a stimulus, because the two
aspects of the stimuli may be represented differently (Breitmeyer
and Ög˘men, 2006).
However, we do not claim that invisibility is always interpre-
tation. To the contrary, as mentioned above, low level limitations
can render a target irreversibly invisible, for example, when the
mask is of high luminance.
So far, we have considered grouping from a Gestalt psychology
point of view. At the moment, we do not want to speculate on
FIGURE 4 | (A) The hexagon on the left is clearly visible. The very
same hexagon is hard to find in the shape in the middle because
adding further elements leads to a very different perceptual
organization. A simpler overall shape is perceived and the hexagon, as
a sub-shape, is rendered invisible (solution on the right, shape in red).
Adopted from Aydin et al. (2011). (B) Either a face or a vase is
perceived. It is impossible to see both interpretations at the same time
(Rubin, 1915). (C) The retina codes the external world by a 2-D
representation. Hence, the brain needs to infer the third dimension. For
example, there are infinitely many pens (only two are shown) that give
rise to the same retinal image. To infer which pen is presented, the
human brain needs to estimate two unknowns, namely the size and
distance of the pen. This is an ill-posed problem, i.e., there is no
unique mathematical solution, since only one value is available, namely
the retinal size of the projection of the pen.
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the neural mechanism that underlie interpretation and grouping
but just like to mention that more and more neurophysiological
evidence (Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011; Wannig et al., 2011)
is becoming available.
3.3. WHY DOES INVISIBILITY OCCUR AT ALL? WHY IS VISIBILITY
UNIQUE AND NOT BAYESIAN?
The idea of invisibility as a goal and interpretation can be traced
back to the Gestaltists who forcefully demonstrated that our per-
ceptual experience is not a simple collection of stimulus elements
but instead is based on the formation of wholes (Gestalts). The
visual input consists of a staggering amount of elementary stim-
ulations (the pixels of an image or photo-receptor activations).
Because there are “infinitely” many possible ways these stimula-
tions can combine together, “laws” such as proximity, similarity,
and good continuation were introduced to limit the number
of possible solutions. Guided by classical physics, according to
which the state of the world is both unique and determined by a
minimum energy principle, the Gestaltists formulated the law of
Prägnanz, which states that only the “simplest” solution becomes
visible and all other solutions remain invisible (Koffka, 1935).
When different solutions are of similar simplicity as in binoc-
ular rivalry or ambiguous figures, such as Rubin’s face/vase exam-
ple, a small difference, such as the locus of attention, can cause
switches between the prevailing solutions. Nevertheless, still only
one solution is visible at a moment (Figure 4B).
Why is there only one interpretation at one moment of time?
There are infinitely many pens that give rise to the very same
retinal image in Figure 4C. Hence, there are infinitely many inter-
pretations. This is the classic ill-posed problem of size perception,
which is just one example of the many ill-posed problems of
vision. Hence, for a unique percept, infinitely many interpreta-
tions of one retinal image need to be invisible. For this reason,
in ambiguous figures and binocular rivalry, there are not two,
but infinitely, many rivaling interpretations, of which only two
or a few can become visible. Hence, rendering information invis-
ible is a normal feat of the human brain. We like to argue that
(in)visibility in masking paradigms often occurs for the same
(normal) reasons.
From a philosophical and computational point of view, one
may ask why is it that the brain has to select only one of the
many possible interpretations for our phenomenal experience. An
alternative view would be a Bayesian type of approach where all
alternative interpretations become visible with some indication
of their likelihood. As mentioned, the Gestalt psychologists were
inspired by classical physics and incorporated into their law of
Prägnanz the notion that the state of the world is unique and is
determined by a minimum energy state (Koffka, 1935). We would
like to add the following arguments: First, even for stimuli as in
the pen example of Figure 4C, there are infinite or close to infinite
possible interpretations and therefore making all of them visible
is not feasible. One may argue that, perhaps one can pick the top
nmost likely interpretations and make this smaller subset visible.
Even if we were to pick a small subset at a given time, the combi-
nations across time would still grow toward infinity. Let’s assume
that a selection is made also in time so as to always limit the num-
ber of visible percepts to n. The problem with this is that it will
break down the unity of consciousness in that the subject will
be living in “parallel realities” where different combinations in
different percepts can lead to different learning and experiences,
whose number and diversity can grow rapidly over time. Thus, we
suggest that a unique visible configuration is chosen to maintain
the unity of consciousness.
3.4. THE ROLE OF VOLITIONAL CONTROL
We do not claim that interpretation is under the control of voli-
tion. To the contrary, integration within the motion streams
of the sequential metacontrast paradigm is mandatory (Herzog,
2007). Observers can only choose to which stream they want to
attend to but they cannot attend to one line individually (see
also Otto et al., 2006, 2008). In addition, integrated features are
usually metamers, i.e., it is impossible to judge whether a per-
ceived vernier offset comes from one or several verniers (Herzog
and Koch, 2001; Scharnowski et al., 2009; Hermens et al., 2010).
The same mechanisms of attention can explain why masking can
be influenced by the task (for a discussion, see Breitmeyer and
Ög˘men, 2006) and individual differences (e.g., Albrecht et al.,
2010).
Neither do we claim that invisibility by interpretation does not
occur stereotypically. The very same stimulus, presented over and
over again, can lead to the very same percept depending on the
rules of grouping of visual scenes. In addition, a stimulus may
lead to the very same percept for different observers and is thus
less variable than, for example, the interpretations of poems.
3.5. METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
(UN)CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
Our results have strong methodological implications for
(un)consciousness research. For example, observers cannot
report the offset direction of the central vernier in the sequen-
tial metacontrast paradigm (Figure 3), simply because the vernier
is invisible. Still, the offset is, unexpectedly from a retinotopic
point of view, visible at the non-offset flanking lines. Hence, vis-
ibility may go unnoticed depending on the task of the observers.
In fact, in the early reports such feature inheritance like effects
were considered as nuisances and potential sources of artifacts
of metacontrast masking (see Hofer et al., 1989; Stewart and
Purcell, 1970). This is important for unconsciousness research,
where the difference in the indirect measure between conscious
and unconscious conditions is often rather small in the range of a
fewmilliseconds of reaction times (Naccache et al., 2002). It hence
may be possible that observers base their indirect measure deci-
sions on inherited features, but not for the direct measure. In this
sense our paradigms offers an interesting alternative to the clas-
sic direct-indirect measures by determining unconsciousness with
two direct measures, which in addition both measure accuracy in
a similar way and have similar sensitivity.
Our results challenge many models of consciousness. For
example, invisibility is often proposed to occur because of a lack
of recurrent processing (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Dehaene
et al., 2001; Naccache et al., 2002). However, in the sequential
metacontrast paradigm flankers integrate with the vernier even
when presented 300ms after vernier onset implicating recurrent
processing because of the long difference in presentation times
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and the integration process. In addition, the vernier offset is vis-
ible at the flankers and hence needs to be processed by recurrent
processing. However, why is then the vernier itself not visible?
Why is the vernier spared from recurrent processing but not its
offset? These kinds of observations are only possible, because we
used direct measures, which allow us to test for long term effects
of invisible features. This is impossible with an indirect measure
such as speeded reactions times.
4. SUMMARY
We have shown that the visibility of an element can crucially
depend on how it is grouped with other elements, even in situ-
ations, which were previously attributed to lower limitations. In
these cases, we propose that the human brain carefully registers
the features of all incoming elements. As our TMS experiments
have shown, these features can be stored for a substantial time of
more than 400ms. During this period, the brain collects infor-
mation to compute which elements belong together and then
integrates features into a coherent percept. Visibility and invisi-
bility are just outcomes of this process. Hence, we have argued
that much of the invisibility found in perception can be the result
of purposeful selections made by the brain. However, there are
many other aspects, including low level limitations and atten-
tional selection, which are as crucial for visibility. Hence, it is
important to clarify in each paradigm and situation to which
extent each of these factors are in operation.
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